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INTRODUCTION
On September 3, 2015, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit suspended the deportation of a transgender Mex-
ican woman because the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA or
Board) had failed to consider the “unique identities and vulner-
abilities” of transgender women in Mexico.1  The BIA had in-
stead looked to recent, increased legal protections in Mexico for
gay, lesbian, and bisexual individuals.2  Accordingly, the BIA
had determined that the defendant, Edin Carey Avendano-Her-
nandez, would not face sufficient danger upon her return to
Mexico to warrant relief under the U.N. Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (CAT).3  The Ninth Circuit reversed in part and
remanded the case for a grant of relief under CAT because
conditions in Mexico for transgender people continue to be ex-
ceedingly dangerous.4
While the BIA’s determination may seem like mere igno-
rance regarding the nuances of sexual orientation and gender
identity, there may be more behind this confusion.  For over a
decade, courts, particularly the Ninth Circuit, have conflated
sexual orientation and gender identity for asylum seekers.5
This conflation may be partly due to ignorance regarding the
nuances of sexual orientation and gender identity and partly
because it is easier for a court to recognize an applicant as a
member of a group that is already established than to create a
new group.
Part I of this Note provides definitions for “transgender”
and “particular social group.”  Part II provides the history of
asylum law relating to claims brought by gay and transgender
1 Avendano-Hernandez v. Lynch, 800 F.3d 1072, 1082 (9th Cir. 2015).
2 See id. at 1080.
3 Id. at 1075; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
4 Avendano-Hernandez, 800 F.3d at 1081–82.
5 See infra Part II.
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people.  Part III analyzes why transgender people fit within the
BIA’s definition of “particular social group” and considers bar-
riers to and benefits of such a development.  Part IV explores
how cisgender women may be able to use the development of
transgender people as a particular social group to procure asy-
lum based on their gender identity.
I
DEFINITIONS
A. Transgender
The word “transgender” has come to serve as an umbrella
term for the gender identities of people who do not solely iden-
tify with the sex that society assigned to them at birth.  These
gender identities can include people who identify as transsexu-
als, cross-dressers, genderqueer, bigender, and many other
formulations of gender identity.6  While transgender people
often identify as men or women, sometimes trans-identified
people identify as both or neither.  “Transgender” can be con-
trasted with “cisgender,” meaning those who identify with the
sex that society assigned to them at birth.  In this Note, “trans-
gender” refers to all people who do not exclusively identify with
the sex that society assigned to them at birth.
B. Sexual Orientation
“Sexual orientation” refers to the innate sexual feelings a
person experiences, and about whom a person experiences
those feelings.7  The gender identity of an individual, in combi-
nation with the gender of the people an individual is attracted
to, defines that person’s sexual orientation.  For instance, the
sexual orientation of a person who identifies as a woman and is
attracted solely to men is heterosexual.  Similarly, the sexual
orientation of a person who identifies as a woman and is at-
tracted solely to women is homosexual.  Sexual orientation en-
compasses a number of identities, as many people are
attracted to multiple genders or to no gender.  Clearly, then,
sexual orientation takes gender identity into account, but sex-
ual orientation is a distinct identity that defines individuals’
sexual proclivities rather than how individuals view their in-
nate genders.
6 See Rebecca L. Stotzer, Violence Against Transgender People: A Review of
United States Data, 14 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 170, 171 (2009).
7 See AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, DEFINITION OF TERMS: SEX, GENDER,
GENDER IDENTITY, SEXUAL ORIENTATION 1 (2011), http://www.apa.org/pi/lgbt/re
sources/sexuality-definitions.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZQ5R-8G9T].
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C. Particular Social Group8
To qualify for asylum under the Immigration and National-
ity Act (INA), applicants must be refugees, meaning that they
satisfy four requirements: (1) they must have a fear of persecu-
tion; (2) this fear must be “well-founded”; (3) the persecution
must be “on account of race, religion, nationality, membership
in a particular social group, or political opinion”; and (4) they
must be unable or unwilling to return to their country because
of this persecution.9
The BIA defined “particular social group” in a 1985 deci-
sion, In re Acosta.10  There, the applicant argued that he had a
well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of his member-
ship in a particular social group comprised of taxi drivers, who
had formed a cooperative organization in El Salvador.11  In de-
termining whether such a class could constitute a “particular
social group,” the BIA articulated that members of a group
must share a “common, immutable characteristic.”12  The
Board also supplied some examples of what could be a qualify-
ing characteristic, such as “sex, color, or kinship ties.”13  Addi-
tionally, the BIA specified that “it must be one that the
members of the group either cannot change, or should not be
required to change because it is fundamental to their individ-
ual identities . . . .”14  The Board reasoned that when the
shared characteristic was immutable or fundamental, it be-
came comparable to the other four categories that are grounds
for asylum: race, religion, nationality, or political opinion.15
Twenty-one years later, in In re C-A-, the BIA added an-
other requirement that a class must satisfy to constitute a
particular social group: “social visibility.”16  In that case, a fam-
8 Case law in the asylum context is somewhat atypical, as decisions at the
immigration court level are not precedential, and only certain decisions of the BIA
are precedential.  This Note focuses only on precedential BIA and circuit court
decisions.
9 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2012); INA § 101(a)(42)(A).
10 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (B.I.A. 1985).  Importantly, while the BIA has certain
definitions and interpretations of “particular social group,” federal circuit courts
often have their own, sometimes conflicting, definitions of the same. See gener-
ally 3 CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 33.04 (rev. ed.
2015) (laying out the definitions that various circuits have attached to “particular
social group”).  This section focuses predominately on the BIA’s definitions.
11 Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 216, 232.
12 Id. at 233.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 233–34.
16 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 959–60 (B.I.A. 2006), aff’d sub nom. Castillo-Arias v.
U.S. Att’y Gen., 446 F.3d 1190 (11th Cir. 2006).
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ily applied for asylum, claiming that they were members of a
particular social group comprised of informants against a drug
cartel in Colombia.17  The Board first applied the Acosta test
and then noted that their previous decisions about what con-
stituted a particular social group had involved characteristics
that were “highly visible and recognizable by others in the
country in question.”18  Relying on guidelines issued by the
United Nations, the BIA held that the family could not be mem-
bers of a particular social group because, as a class, infor-
mants would typically remain anonymous and were therefore
not visible, even though in this case the cartel had previously
threatened the family.19
The BIA has since renamed this “social visibility” require-
ment as “social distinction,” thereby clarifying that society
must perceive the group as a distinct class rather than be able
to visually identify that group of people.20  Before this clarifica-
tion, some circuits had rejected the social visibility requirement
because they believed that it referred to “ocular” visibility.21
Ocular visibility means that someone passing members of the
group on the street would recognize that they belonged to that
particular social group simply by looking at them.22  In re-
jecting this definition in In re W-G-R-, the BIA explained that
“[a]lthough the society in question need not be able to easily
identify who is a member of the group, it must be commonly
recognized that the shared characteristic is one that defines
the group.”23  Therefore, “[t]o have the ‘social distinction’ neces-
sary to establish a particular social group, there must be evi-
dence showing that society in general perceives, considers, or
recognizes persons sharing the particular characteristic to be a
group.”24
17 Id. at 953.
18 Id. at 960.
19 Id. at 952, 960.
20 In re W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 216 (B.I.A. 2014).
21 Id. at 211; see, e.g., Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y Gen., 663 F.3d 582, 605
(3d Cir. 2011) (“Women who have not yet undergone female genital mutilation in
tribes that practice it do not look any different from anyone else.”); Ramos v.
Holder, 589 F.3d 426, 430 (7th Cir. 2009).
22 See Ramos, 589 F.3d at 430 (“[Y]ou can be a member of a particular social
group only if a complete stranger could identify you as a member if he encoun-
tered you in the street, because of your appearance, gait, speech pattern, behavior
or other discernible characteristic.”).
23 In re W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 217.
24 Id.
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In re C-A- also alluded to a “particularity” requirement for a
particular social group, but did not detail what it entails.25  A
2008 BIA decision, In re S-E-G-, explained that a group is par-
ticular if it “can accurately be described in a manner suffi-
ciently distinct that the group would be recognized . . . as a
discrete class of persons.”26  The Board clarified in 2014 that
particularity “chiefly addresses the question of delineation” of
who is a member.27
The BIA has indicated that while the size of the group is
one factor that courts should consider in determining particu-
larity, the essential concern is whether the group is “too amor-
phous . . . to create a benchmark for determining group
membership.”28  Indeed, the BIA has ruled that the possibility
that most nationals of a certain country would qualify as mem-
bers does not preclude a class of people from being a particular
social group.29  On the other hand, some circuits have held
that such a possibility probably disqualifies that group.  For
instance, the Ninth Circuit declared that “[m]ajor segments” of
a country’s population could rarely, if ever, constitute a partic-
ular social group.30  Similarly, the Third Circuit has indicated
that the large size of a class of people may preclude them from
being a particular social group.31
II
SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND “SEXUAL IDENTITY” AS BASES
FOR PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUPS
Until the 1990s, no court recognized gay people as a partic-
ular social group; someone experiencing persecution on the
basis of their sexual orientation could not receive asylum.32  In
1990, the landmark BIA decision In re Toboso-Alfonso recog-
25 In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 957 (B.I.A. 2006), aff’d sub nom. Castillo-
Arias v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 446 F.3d 1190 (11th Cir. 2006).
26 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 584 (B.I.A. 2008).
27 In re W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 214.
28 In re S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 584 (citing Davila-Mejia v. Mukasey, 531
F.3d 624, 628–29 (8th Cir. 2008)).
29 In re H-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 337, 343–44 (B.I.A. 1996).
30 Ochoa v. Gonzales, 406 F.3d 1166, 1171 (9th Cir. 2005).
31 See Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 171–72 (3d Cir. 2003) (“[C]hildren
as a class represent an extremely large and diverse group . . . .”).
32 In fact, gay and lesbian noncitizens were not even able to enter or immi-
grate to the United States before 1990. See INA § 212(a)(4); 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4)
(1988) (repealed 1990).  At the time, the United States was the only country in the
world with an explicit policy of excluding noncitizens on the basis of their sexual
orientation.  Shannon Minter, Sodomy and Public Morality Offenses Under U.S.
Immigration Law: Penalizing Lesbian and Gay Identity, 26 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 771,
771 (1993).
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nized, for the first time, that gay people could be a particular
social group.33  In that case, the BIA granted withholding of
deportation to a gay man from Cuba.34  The Immigration and
Naturalization Service argued against such a grant because it
“would be tantamount to awarding discretionary relief to those
involved in behavior that is not only socially deviant in nature,
but in violation of the laws or regulations of the country as
well,” referring to the sodomy laws that still existed at the
time.35  The BIA dismissed this argument, explaining that it
was not Toboso-Alfonso’s homosexual conduct that subjected
him to persecution in Cuba but his identity as a gay man.
Though the BIA did not initially designate In re Toboso-
Alfonso as a precedential opinion, the Attorney General issued
an order several years later, declaring it as precedent “in all
proceedings involving the same issue or issues.”36  Accordingly,
various circuit courts have recognized that gay people consti-
tute a particular social group in subsequent asylum cases.37
A. “Gay Men with Female Sexual Identities”
A decade after In re Toboso-Alfonso, the Ninth Circuit over-
turned a BIA decision denying asylum to a transgender woman
in Hernandez-Montiel v. INS.38  Although the court noted that
“at the age of 12, [Hernandez-Montiel] began dressing and be-
33 20 I. & N. Dec. 819, 822–23 (B.I.A. 1990).
34 Id. at 823.  Withholding of deportation, now called “restriction on removal,”
is an alternative form of relief to asylum.  8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (2012); INA
§ 241(b)(3)(A).  To qualify for restriction on removal, applicants must also be flee-
ing persecution on the basis of their race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion.  While asylum is a discretionary form
of relief, restriction on removal is mandatory if applicants meet all the require-
ments.  Abankwah v. INS, 185 F.3d 18, 22 (2d Cir. 1999).  Applicants who would
probably not qualify for asylum because, for instance, they have committed
crimes, may still qualify for restriction on removal. NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUST. CTR.,
BASIC PROCEDURAL MANUAL FOR ASYLUM REPRESENTATION AFFIRMATIVELY AND IN RE-
MOVAL PROCEEDINGS 17 (2016), http://immigrantjustice.org/sites/immigrantjus-
tice.org/files/NIJC%20Asylum%20Manual_05%202016_final.pdf [https://
perma.cc/H2WK-MA69].  However, the burden for restriction on removal is higher
than that for asylum, and applicants must prove that, more likely than not, they
will face persecution if they return to their country. See INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S.
407, 429–30 (1984).  By contrast, asylum claims require only that the applicant
have a well-founded fear of persecution, meaning that persecution need only be a
reasonable possibility.  INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 440 (1987).
35 Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 822 (internal quotation marks omitted).
36 Att’y Gen. Order No. 1895-94 (June 19, 1994).
37 See, e.g., Nabulwala v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 1115, 1118 (8th Cir. 2007)
(“[H]omosexuals may be [members] of a ‘particular social group’ . . . .”); Karouni v.
Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1163, 1171 (9th Cir. 2005).
38 225 F.3d 1084, 1099 (9th Cir. 2000).
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having as a woman,”39 and that she had been taking female
hormones,40 the word transgender does not appear in the deci-
sion.41  Instead, the court characterized Hernandez-Montiel as
a “gay man with a female sexual identity” and used male pro-
nouns to describe her throughout.42  Thomas M. Davies, Jr.,
an expert witness on conditions for gay people in Mexico in the
case, explained that a gay man has a “female sexual identity” if
he assumes the “stereotypical ‘female,’ i.e., passive role in [gay]
sexual relationships.”43  He also indicated that men with fe-
male sexual identities often behave and dress as women.  Da-
vies further noted that, conversely, men in Latin America may
engage in homosexual activity without persecution so long as
they assume the “male” role.44
Importantly, the Ninth Circuit recognized that the persecu-
tion Hernandez-Montiel would face as someone with a “female
sexual identity” is distinct from the treatment that others who
have homosexual sex might encounter.45  Nevertheless, the
court cited In re Toboso-Alfonso to show that sexual orientation
could be the basis for a particular social group and defined
Hernandez-Montiel’s particular social group as “gay men with
female sexual identities in Mexico.”46  Unlike the immigration
judge (IJ) and the BIA, the Ninth Circuit focused on the immu-
tability of Hernandez-Montiel’s “sexual identity” in determining
that she was a member of a particular social group, rather than
the mutability of her female dress.47
Although a limited number of cases clearly deal with trans-
gender asylum applicants, they largely follow the reasoning of
Hernandez-Montiel, especially, unsurprisingly, within the
Ninth Circuit.  Several years later, the Ninth Circuit again used
the term “female sexual identity” in a case about a transgender
woman who fled El Salvador, Reyes-Reyes v. Ashcroft.48  The
39 Id. at 1087.
40 Id. at 1088.
41 This Note uses the pronouns that correspond to applicants’ gender identi-
ties, rather than the pronouns employed by the courts in many decisions which
largely correspond to the sex assigned to the applicants at birth.  However, it is
possible that the courts were not incorrect in using male pronouns for applicants
who presented themselves as female.  Since transgender identities vary widely, an
individual may choose to present as female much of the time but continue to use
male pronouns.
42 Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d at 1099.
43 Id. at 1089.
44 Id.
45 See id.
46 Id. at 1094.
47 Id. at 1094–96.
48 384 F.3d 782, 785 (9th Cir. 2004).
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court noted that she had gone by female names, had a “deep
female identity,” and employed “characteristically female ap-
pearance, mannerisms, and gestures,” though she had not
“undergone sex reassignment surgery.”49  Further, the court
even mentioned in a footnote that she exhibited “transsexual
behavior.”50  Nevertheless, the court consistently referred to
Reyes using male pronouns, called her a “homosexual male,”
and spoke of her “female sexual identity.”51  Interestingly, the
Ninth Circuit’s decision did not explicitly discuss whether
Reyes was a member of a particular social group, though the
court did mention in a footnote that sexual identity is “inherent
to one’s very identity as a person.”52  The court therefore im-
plicitly recognized that Reyes’s female sexual identity meant
that she was a member of a particular social group.53
The Ninth Circuit employed the same reasoning in Ornelas-
Chavez v. Gonzales, a case involving another transgender
woman from Mexico.54  As in Hernandez-Montiel and Reyes-
Reyes, the court discussed both Ornelas-Chavez’s “homosexu-
ality” and her “female sexual identity,” again using male pro-
nouns throughout the decision.55  By the time of this decision,
the Ninth Circuit had firmly determined that gay men with
female sexual identities constituted a particular social group.
Indeed, the court noted in a footnote that “[w]hether Ornelas-
Chavez belongs to a protected social group is not at issue in
this appeal,” citing Hernandez-Montiel.56
B. “Transsexual” Individuals
Though most Ninth Circuit asylum decisions involving
transgender individuals have used the term “female sexual
identity” and employed male pronouns,57 one 2007 decision
referred to a Mexican applicant as a “transsexual” woman and
49 Id.
50 Id. at 785 n.1.
51 Id. at 785.
52 Id. at 785 n.1 (citing Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d at 1093).
53 See id.  The court did not need to explicitly decide whether Reyes was a
member of a particular social group, as it remanded the case so the BIA could
reconsider her withholding-of-removal claim using the correct legal standard.
However, by remanding the case, the court indicated that the BIA could make
such a finding.
54 458 F.3d 1052, 1054 (9th Cir. 2006).
55 Id.
56 Id. at 1056 n.3 (citing Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d at 1094).
57 See, e.g., id. at 1054 (“Ornelas-Chavez’s dealings with government officials
. . . [were] marked by either animus toward his female sexual identity or tacit
acceptance of the abuse he received because of it.”).
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used female pronouns.58  The procedural posture in this case
was such that the court never had to decide whether the appli-
cant, Morales, belonged to a particular social group.59  Instead,
the court remanded the case for reconsideration on the asylum
issue because the IJ had based his denial of Morales’s asylum
claim on improper evidence relating to her criminal
convictions.
However, the Ninth Circuit decision noted that the IJ had
stated that “but for Morales’s conviction . . . he would have
found her eligible for asylum under Hernandez-Montiel v.
INS.”60  This seems to indicate that the IJ intended to group
Morales with Hernandez-Montiel’s gay men with female sexual
identities, conflating sexual orientation and gender identity.
The IJ also denied Morales CAT relief because he did not be-
lieve that it was more likely than not that she would experience
persecution, based in part on evidence of a gay pride parade in
Mexico City, further demonstrating that the IJ blended sexual
orientation and gender identity.61  While using Morales’s cor-
rect pronouns and acknowledging that she identified as a
woman indicate progress in the Ninth Circuit’s conception of
transgender people, failing to critique the IJ’s conflation of
these distinct categories shows that the court continued to
mischaracterize gender identity.
Eight years later, the Ninth Circuit again received a case of
a transgender applicant from Mexico in Avendano-Hernandez
v. Lynch.62  This time, however, the court highlighted the dis-
tinct, albeit overlapping, nature of sexual orientation and gen-
der identity.63  While the Ninth Circuit finally understood and
acknowledged this important difference, it was not able to
carve out an official particular social group in this opinion be-
cause Avendano-Hernandez did not qualify for restriction on
removal.64  Avendano-Hernandez had a felony conviction for
58 Morales v. Gonzales, 478 F.3d 972, 975 (9th Cir. 2007).
59 See id. at 984–85.
60 Id. at 977.
61 To qualify for relief under CAT, applicants must show that, if they were to
return to their country, the government would more likely than not torture them
or acquiesce to their torture. Id. at 983.  Despite this higher burden, convictions
of particularly serious crimes will not bar applicants from relief under CAT,
though it would for asylum or restriction on removal. See NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUST.
CTR., supra note 34, at 18, 20.
62 800 F.3d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 2015).
63 Id. at 1081 (“While the relationship between gender identity and sexual
orientation is complex, and sometimes overlapping, the two identities are
distinct.”).
64 Id. at 1078.  Avendano-Hernandez did not apply for asylum, for which she
also would not have been eligible due to her conviction.  Though the court used
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drunk driving, a “particularly serious crime,” and therefore was
ineligible for that form of relief.65  Accordingly, her only option
was relief under CAT, which does not require membership in a
particular social group, unlike asylum and restriction on re-
moval.66  The court found that Avendano-Hernandez was eligi-
ble for relief under CAT due to the unique persecution faced by
transgender women in Mexico and remanded the case for a
grant of CAT.67  So, while the court seemed prepared to declare
transgender women in Mexico a particular social group,68 the
facts of this case did not present such an opportunity.  No
court has yet expressly articulated a particular social group
made up of transgender people.
III
TRANSGENDER IDENTITY SHOULD QUALIFY AS A BASIS FOR
A PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Avendano-Hernandez illu-
minated the importance of separating sexual orientation from
gender identity in asylum law.  Since the two identities are
distinct, transgender people may experience disparate treat-
ment in the countries of their nationality if they are trans-
gender rather than gay.  While gay, lesbian, and bisexual
people may be making major strides in certain countries,
transgender people often face distinct, increased levels of per-
secution.69  Accordingly, the BIA and federal circuit courts
should recognize that transgender people are a particular so-
cial group that faces unique challenges in many countries.
This Note focuses on the BIA’s definition of particular social
group and argues why transgender people are a particular so-
cial group for asylum purposes.
the term “withholding of removal,” it was referring to the relief of restriction on
removal, a common practice of the BIA and federal courts. Id. at 1077; see 3
GORDON ET AL., supra note 10, § 33.04[3]. R
65 Avendano-Hernandez, 800 F.3d at 1078.
66 See 3 GORDON ET AL., supra note 10, § 33.06[1] n.1. R
67 Avendano-Hernandez, 800 F.3d at 1082.
68 See id. (“The unique identities and vulnerabilities of transgender individu-
als must be considered in evaluating a transgender applicant’s asylum, withhold-
ing of removal, or CAT claim.”).
69 See Katie McDonough, The Last Acceptable Bigotry?: How Cultural Igno-
rance Is Killing Trans Americans, SALON (Aug. 29, 2013, 7:45 AM), http://
www.salon.com/2013/08/29/the_last_acceptable_bigotry_how_cultural_igno
rance_is_killing_trans_americans/ [https://perma.cc/L74L-U8UR].
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A. Possible Reasons for Hernandez-Montiel’s Conflation
To understand the benefits and challenges of recognizing
that transgender people constitute a particular social group, it
is important to first examine why the conflation of sexual orien-
tation and gender identity occurred in Hernandez-Montiel and
its progeny.
There are several possible reasons why the Ninth Circuit
referred to Hernandez-Montiel as a “gay man with a female
sexual identity” rather than as a transgender woman.  First,
the court, and potentially even Professor Davies, an expert wit-
ness on Mexico, may simply not have been familiar with the
concept of transgender identity in 2000.70  Second, Mexican
society at the time may not have conceived of transgender iden-
tity as entirely separate from gay identity.  Indeed, Professor
Davies’s testimony in Hernandez-Montiel may have been accu-
rate in its description of how Mexican society perceived trans-
gender women: as gay men who assumed the passive role in
sex.71  Since the crucial inquiry in asylum cases is how society
will view and treat applicants in the countries of their national-
ity, rather than in the United States, the appropriate question
is how Mexicans would view Hernandez-Montiel.
Lastly, Hernandez-Montiel’s attorneys likely made a strate-
gic decision to cast her identity within the scope of sexual ori-
entation, as sexual orientation was already an established
basis for membership in a particular social group.72  It would
be easier for her attorneys to link her identity with a group that
had already gained protected status than to create a new pro-
tected group.  Furthermore, asylum law, where people’s lives
are necessarily at risk if they have a viable claim, is not an ideal
venue for impact litigation.  It makes sense that applicants and
their attorneys would rather take the path of least resistance
than change the law to make future claims easier for similarly
situated individuals.  Indeed, Joseph Landau, the attorney for
Reyes in Reyes-Reyes v. Ashcroft, has explained that his client
70 Transgender visibility has increased dramatically since 2000.  Many trans-
gender advocacy organizations, such as the National Center for Transgender
Equality, only came into existence in the early 2000s.  Megan Townsend, Timeline:
A Look Back at the History of Transgender Visibility, GLAAD (Nov. 19, 2012),
http://www.glaad.org/blog/timeline-look-back-history-transgender-visibility
[https://perma.cc/4Q88-B5E3].
71 Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1094 (9th Cir. 2000).
72 It is a common strategy for LGBT rights attorneys to group an unprotected
class of people with a protected one rather than fighting for new, formal protec-
tions.  For instance, many courts have extended laws that protect against sex
discrimination to protect transgender people from discrimination. See infra sec-
tion IV.B.1.
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did actually identify as transgender.  Nevertheless, he and his
colleagues chose to base Reyes’s claim on her uncontested
membership in a previously established particular social
group, gay men with female sexual identities,73 rather than
focus on her transgender identity.74
B. Transgender Identity Is a Common, Immutable, and
Fundamental Characteristic
Transgender individuals share a common characteristic in
that they all possess gender identities that differ from the sex
they were assigned at birth.  Though transgender identity can
take many forms because it is an umbrella term, this group of
people has a common characteristic in that they all do not
identify solely with the sex society assigned to them at birth.
Further, experts today consider one’s transgender identity
innate and therefore immutable,75 placing transgender identity
squarely within Acosta’s requirement that members of a partic-
ular social group share a “common, immutable characteris-
tic.”76  Indeed, in Acosta the BIA even enumerated “sex” as one
such characteristic that a court could find to be common and
immutable.77
One possible critique of the stance that being transgender
is immutable is the viewpoint that transgender people can
change their appearance and choose at times to dress and
behave in a manner consistent with the sex assigned to them at
birth.  However, the Ninth Circuit in Hernandez-Montiel ad-
dressed and rejected this line of reasoning, which the IJ and
BIA had employed in denying asylum to Hernandez-Montiel.78
While the court conceded that gay men with female sexual
identities can alter the physical manifestations of their identity,
it held that a person’s identity, not the expression of that iden-
73 See Reyes-Reyes v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 782, 785 (9th Cir. 2004).
74 Laurie Berg & Jenni Millbank, Developing a Jurisprudence of Transgender
Particular Social Group, in FLEEING HOMOPHOBIA: SEXUAL ORIENTATION, GENDER IDEN-
TITY AND ASYLUM 121, 133 (Thomas Spijkerboer ed., 2013).  However, Landau did
include Reyes’s transgender identity as an alternate argument for membership in
a particular social group.  Further, Reyes’s attorneys referred to her as trans-
gender in briefing, though the court declined to incorporate such language into
the opinion.  Joseph Landau, “Soft Immutability” and “Imputed Gay Identity”:
Recent Developments in Transgender and Sexual-Orientation-Based Asylum Law,
32 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 237, 249 (2005).
75 See, e.g., VANESSA SHERIDAN, THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO TRANSGENDER IN THE
WORKPLACE 18 (2009); DAVID SUE, DERALD WING SUE, DIANE SUE, & STANLEY SUE,
UNDERSTANDING ABNORMAL BEHAVIOR 449 (2015).
76 In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985).
77 Id.
78 Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1089 (9th Cir. 2000).
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tity, must be immutable under the Acosta analysis for a partic-
ular social group.79
The same reasoning applies to people who identify as
transgender.  While their expression may change, especially for
those who identify as gender fluid and may dress as women one
day and as men the next, their identities as transgender people
are immutable.  Though in the past courts have required scien-
tific or biological proof that a trait is immutable, in Hernandez-
Montiel, the Ninth Circuit “embrace[d] non-biological forms of
identity” by acknowledging that one’s sexual identity is innate
and immutable.80  Other jurisdictions’ adoption of gay people
as a particular social group shows that this relaxed immutabil-
ity standard is now widespread.81  Therefore, while an appli-
cant may not be able to provide scientific proof of their
transgender identity, they can still establish that this identity-
related characteristic is immutable.
Even if a court were to rule that transgender identity is not
immutable, people’s transgender identity should still qualify
them for membership in a particular social group because it is
so “fundamental to their individual identities” that they should
not be required to change it.82  Given the innate nature of a
person’s gender identity and the importance that society places
on one’s gender identity and expression,83 being transgender is
fundamental to a person’s identity.  Indeed, medical profes-
sionals often diagnose transgender people who are not able to
express themselves in ways consistent with their gender iden-
tity as having gender dysphoria, a serious medical condition
that can lead to such high levels of distress that the condition
becomes life threatening.84
C. Transgender People Are a Socially Distinct Group
In Avendano-Hernandez, the Ninth Circuit explicitly noted
that sexual orientation and gender identity are distinct, even
79 See id. at 1096.
80 Landau, supra note 74, at 250.  Joseph Landau has described the court’s
reasoning in Hernandez-Montiel, which asserts that one’s sexual identity is innate
and immutable, as a “soft immutability standard.” Id.
81 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
82 Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233.
83 See generally Cecilia L. Ridgeway & Shelley J. Correll, Unpacking the Gen-
der System: A Theoretical Perspective on Gender Beliefs and Social Relations, 18
SOC’Y & GENDER 510, 513–21 (2004) (examining the significant role gender plays in
“social relational contexts”).
84 See LAMBDA LEGAL, FAQ on Access to Transition-Related Care, http://
www.lambdalegal.org/know-your-rights/transgender/transition-related-care-
faq#q1 [https://perma.cc/5ACT-PD8M].
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while noting that the identities may overlap.85  The court also
noted that transgender people tend to be especially visible and
vulnerable.  To bolster the assertion that transgender people
are uniquely vulnerable to persecution, the court pointed to a
document recently released by Immigration and Customs En-
forcement detailing steps detention officers should take to
properly care for detained transgender people.86  The court also
referenced the particularly dire conditions for transgender peo-
ple in Mexico,87 which shows that, while transgender people
are often distinct and uniquely vulnerable, in determining so-
cial distinction, it is crucial to examine to what extent people in
an applicant’s country of nationality would single out trans-
gender individuals.
The degree to which transgender people are socially dis-
tinct varies from country to country.  While in a country such
as the United States transgender people are increasingly gain-
ing recognition, the societies of some countries may not know
much about transgender people or what it means to be trans-
gender.  Indeed, even in the United States, many people do not
understand the difference between sexual orientation and gen-
der identity, as evidenced by the court’s decision in Hernandez-
Montiel.88  Nevertheless, understanding of a distinct identity is
not equivalent to perception, meaning social distinction can
exist even where society is ignorant to the intricacies of trans-
gender identity.
Accordingly, a transgender individual’s claim for asylum is
likely to take one of two forms regarding social distinction, each
of which will place the applicant within a particular social
group.  One possibility is that the people in an applicant’s
country of nationality recognize a distinction between a per-
son’s sexual orientation and gender identity, and they perse-
cute individuals uniquely on the basis of their gender identity,
such as the situation described in Avendano-Hernandez.89
Even though some people used gay slurs against Avendano-
Hernandez in Mexico, clearly confusing her gender identity and
sexual orientation, the court still found that transgender wo-
men in Mexico faced unique persecution, noting that “police
85 Avendano-Hernandez v. Lynch, 800 F.3d 1072, 1081 (9th Cir. 2015).
86 Id. at 1081 n.4; THOMAS HOMAN, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, FURTHER
GUIDANCE REGARDING THE CARE OF TRANSGENDER DETAINEES (2015), https://
www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Document/2015/TransgenderCare
Memorandum.pdf [https://perma.cc/9MQ7-W5P8].
87 Avendano-Hernandez, 800 F.3d at 1081.
88 See Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1088 (9th Cir. 2000).
89 Avendano-Hernandez, 800 F.3d at 1081.
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specifically target the transgender community for extortion and
sexual favors.”90  While, as the court noted, rights for gay, les-
bian, and bisexual people in Mexico have improved,91 trans-
gender individuals in Mexico have fewer rights and face more
violence.92
Similarly, transgender women in Honduras tend to experi-
ence worse persecution than gay, lesbian, or bisexual individu-
als, though those groups also face significant violence.93
According to a Honduran activist, a disproportionate number
of murders of lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender (LGBT)
people in Honduras are of transgender women.94  Further, the
murders of transgender women tend to be more violent than
those of other LGBT people, exhibiting signs of torture and
castration.
Further, in some countries, both gay and transgender peo-
ple experience discrimination, but the form of harassment and
violence may vary between groups, showing the distinctness of
each one.  For instance, though both gay and transgender
Ugandans face persecution, civilians and authorities alike in
Uganda often harass and assault transgender people in ways
that indicate that it is because of their gender identity.95  Au-
thorities in Uganda sometimes arrest transgender women for
“impersonating a woman,” showing that Ugandans see trans-
90 Id.
91 As of June 2015, it is unconstitutional to deny marriage licenses to same-
sex couples in all Mexican states.  Randal C. Archibold & Paulina Villegas, With
Little Fanfare, Mexican Supreme Court Legalizes Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES,
June 14, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/15/world/americas/with-
little-fanfare-mexican-supreme-court-effectively-legalizes-same-sex-marriage.
html [https://perma.cc/CX43-ELKS].  While this does not guarantee safety to gay
Mexicans, it does seem to indicate progress in the legal sphere.
92 See TVT RESEARCH PROJECT, TRANS MURDER MONITORING RESULTS: TMM TDOR
2015 UPDATE (2015), http://transrespect.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/TvT
-TMM-Tables_2008-2015_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/43G3-22N9] (showing that
Mexico had the second highest transgender murder rate worldwide between 2008
and 2015).
93 Allison Lopez, Nelson Arambu´, of Honduras: “We Do Not Want to Come Back
Here Next Year to Report More Murders of the LGBT Community,” LATIN AMERICA
WORKING GROUP (Aug. 5, 2014), http://www.lawg.org/action-center/lawg-blog/69
-general/1363-nelson-arambu-of-honduras-we-do-not-want-to-come-back-here-
next-year-to-report-more-murders-of-the-lgbt-community [https://perma.cc/
R2FD-L6EA].
94 See id.
95 See Uganda: Anti-Homosexuality Act’s Heavy Toll, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
(May 14, 2014), https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/05/14/uganda-anti-homo
sexuality-acts-heavy-toll [https://perma.cc/2P8W-VSNM].
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gender women not as gay men, but as men dressing as
women.96
Therefore, in a situation in which people uniquely perse-
cute transgender people, transgender people are unequivocally
socially distinct and qualify as a particular social group.  While
persecution alone does not make a group of people socially
distinct, it is not their persecution that would make trans-
gender people in a country a particular social group.  Rather,
when people in a certain society persecute transgender people
in ways that are unique to how they persecute other people, it
indicates that the society perceives transgender people as dis-
tinct.  That people are able to recognize transgender people as a
discrete group, not that a society persecutes them, makes
transgender people socially distinct in such a scenario.
However, applicants from these societies would need more
evidence than the fact that people in their countries persecute
transgender people to establish that they are distinct.  Though
obtaining such evidence could prove difficult for some appli-
cants, if a society views transgender people as distinct enough
to persecute them uniquely, it is likely that there are other
indicators of this distinction.  According to the BIA, “country
conditions reports, expert witness testimony, and press ac-
counts of discriminatory laws and policies, historical animosi-
ties, and the like may establish that a group exists and is
perceived as ‘distinct’ . . . .”97  In societies where people
uniquely persecute transgender people, it is likely that there
are other records of discrimination and animosity that will cor-
roborate the applicant’s assertion that transgender people are
distinct.
Another theoretical possibility is that people in certain
countries do not recognize any distinction between gay and
transgender people but persecute both groups identically as
gay people.  In such a scenario, one could argue that trans-
gender people are not socially distinct and therefore are not a
particular social group.  However, even if that were the case,
transgender people may be able to establish membership in a
particular social group on the basis of their imputed gay iden-
tity, meaning that people in their society perceive them to be
96 Id. Transgender Ugandans have also reported that civilians and the police
have asked them if they are men or women and have tried to “check” by touching
their genitalia. Id.
97 In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 244 (B.I.A. 2014).
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gay, regardless of how they actually identify.98  A Third Circuit
decision, Amanfi v. Ashcroft, held that imputed gay identity
qualifies an asylum applicant for membership in a particular
social group.99  Other courts have adopted Amanfi’s recognition
of imputed gay identity.100
The notion of an imputed gay identity has its roots in the
concept of imputed political opinion, which nearly every circuit
and the BIA have recognized can qualify an applicant for asy-
lum on the basis of their political opinion.101  Applicants seek-
ing asylum on the basis of political opinion can establish that
they are refugees by showing that their persecutors have attrib-
uted to them certain political opinions.102  Whether the appli-
cants actually hold these opinions is irrelevant to an asylum
claim in these circumstances.103  Some courts have recognized
that applicants may bring claims of imputed race,104 national-
ity,105 or religion.106  Though compared to the extensive case
law on imputed political opinion there has been little discus-
sion on whether imputed membership in a particular social
group can qualify an applicant as a refugee, Amanfi v. Ashcroft
clearly established that imputed membership in a particular
social group can serve as a basis for asylum.107
In addition, the Attorney General implicitly recognized im-
puted gay identity in establishing In re Toboso-Alfonso as prece-
98 See generally Landau, supra note 74, at 258–62 (advocating for imputed
gay identity as a legal argument for transgender asylum applicants).
99 328 F.3d 719, 730 (3d Cir. 2003).
100 See, e.g., Pozos v. Gonzales, 141 F. App’x 629, 631 (9th Cir. 2005).
101 See, e.g., Chavarria v. Gonzalez, 446 F.3d 508, 518 (3d Cir. 2006); Chun
Gao v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 122, 129 (2d Cir. 2005); De Brenner v. Ashcroft, 388
F.3d 629, 636 (8th Cir. 2004); Estrada-Escobar v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 1042, 1047
(10th Cir. 2004); Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1262, 1289 (11th Cir. 2001);
Vasquez v. INS, 177 F.3d 62, 65 (1st Cir. 1999); Mya Lwin v. INS, 144 F.3d 505,
509 (7th Cir. 1998); Cruz-Diaz v. INS, 86 F.3d 330, 332 (4th Cir. 1996); In re C-Y-
Z-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 915, 922 (BIA 1997); see generally 3 GORDON ET AL., supra note
10, § 33.04[4][d][i][A][2] (providing an overview of the doctrine of imputed political R
opinion).
102 See Desir v. Ilchert, 840 F.2d 723, 729 (9th Cir. 1988).
103 See Sangha v. INS, 103 F.3d 1482, 1489 (9th Cir. 1997).
104 See Eduard v. Ashcroft, 379 F.3d 182, 188 (5th Cir. 2004) (assuming
without deciding that imputed Chinese identity could serve as a basis for refugee
status).
105 See Castaneda v. INS, 23 F.3d 1576, 1577–78 (10th Cir. 1994) (assuming
without deciding that imputed Nicaraguan nationality could serve as a basis for
refugee status).
106 See Rizal v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 84, 90 n.7 (2d Cir. 2006).
107 See 328 F.3d 719, 730 (3d Cir. 2003) (“We therefore hold that persecution
‘on account of ’ membership in a social group, as defined in INA §§ 101(a)(42)(A)
and 241(b)(3), includes what the persecutor perceives to be the applicant’s mem-
bership in a social group . . . .”).
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dent.  In her order, Attorney General Janet Reno stated that the
case applies to “an individual who has been identified as a
homosexual and persecuted by his or her government for that
reason alone.”108  This order protects applicants with imputed
gay identities because it requires only that their societies have
identified them as homosexuals, not that they actually identify
as gay or engage in homosexual conduct.  Accordingly, even if
one could establish that people in a particular country did not
distinguish between transgender and gay people and perse-
cuted both groups in an identical fashion, a transgender appli-
cant would likely qualify as a member of a particular social
group by virtue of their imputed gay identity.
Importantly, it is irrelevant to the social distinction analy-
sis whether people in a certain society are able to visually iden-
tify transgender people.  Due to the BIA’s recent clarification
that social distinction does not refer to ocular visibility, the
important inquiry is not whether transgender people present as
transgender, but whether their society recognizes that a group
of transgender individuals exists in their society.109  Therefore,
even if some transgender people are able to pass as cisgender,
either consistent with their gender identity or with the sex as-
signed to them at birth, it has no effect on the social distinction
inquiry.  The irrelevance of ocular visibility is particularly im-
portant in the context of transgender individuals, as it is the
identity that asylum law protects and, therefore, that the soci-
ety in question must perceive, rather than the behavior.110
Of course, transgender identity is often manifested
through transgender people’s conduct and appearance, which
allows for a society to perceive them as a distinct group of
people.  Nevertheless, the shift away from ocular visibility en-
sures that transgender people need not all present as trans-
gender for them to be a socially distinct group.
D. Transgender People Are a Particular Group
Transgender people are clearly particular, as they comply
with the BIA’s main concern that one be able to delineate who
is and is not a member.  As the BIA requires, one could de-
scribe transgender people in a manner sufficiently distinct to
recognize them as a discrete group.  Admittedly, there is varia-
108 Att’y Gen. Order, supra note 36; see Landau, supra note 74, at 259.
109 See supra notes 21–24 and accompanying text.
110 Cf. Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1096 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting
that the identities of gay men with female sexual identities must be immutable,
not their behavior).
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tion within the overarching category of transgender.  People
who identify as agender, meaning that they have no gender,
have unique gender identities from those who identify as fe-
male-to-male.111  However, these two types of people, along
with the many other identities that fall within the term “trans-
gender,” are all within one group in that society assigned to
them at birth a sex that differs from their gender identity.  This
definition is sufficiently precise to delineate membership in the
group.  While several jurisdictions have found that characteris-
tics such as wealth112 and poverty113 are too amorphous and
relative to allow one to determine who possesses such a char-
acteristic, the quality of being transgender is not similarly sub-
jective.  Though there is room for variation within the category
of transgender people, it is still a discrete group that is not too
amorphous to define.
Further, there is no issue with the size of the category of
transgender people.  While it is difficult to obtain an accurate
estimate of what percentage of the population identifies as
transgender, some studies have estimated that transgender
people make up somewhere between 0.1–0.5% of the popula-
tion in the United States.114  Though these statistics come from
surveys and may underestimate the total number of trans-
gender people, it is unlikely that the number is so inaccurate as
to constitute too large a group in any country to satisfy the
particularity requirement.  This is especially true since only
certain courts require that a particular social group be small in
number.
E. Potential Credibility Issues in Application
To qualify for asylum, applicants must establish that they
are credible, since under the REAL ID Act of 2005, there is no
presumption of credibility before an IJ.115  The credibility de-
termination has long been a major barrier to people bringing
111 Agender, LGBTQIA+ INFO, http://lgbtqiainfo.weebly.com/agender.html
[https://perma.cc/EZ8Y-SEW6].
112 In re A-M-E- & J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 76 (B.I.A. 2007).
113 Escobar v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 363, 368 (3d Cir. 2005).
114 See Mona Chalabi, Why We Don’t Know the Size of the Transgender Popula-
tion, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (July 29, 2014, 4:31 PM), http://fivethirtyeight.com/fea
tures/why-we-dont-know-the-size-of-the-transgender-population/ [https://per
ma.cc/3H2Q-AXBD]; GARY J. GATES, THE WILLIAMS INSTITUTE, HOW MANY PEOPLE ARE
LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, AND TRANSGENDER? 5–6 (2011).
115 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (2012); Pub. L. No. 109-13, div. B, 119 Stat. 231
(2005); 3 GORDON ET AL., supra note 10, § 33.04[5][f]. R
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\102-1\CRN105.txt unknown Seq: 21  8-NOV-16 13:37
2016] “UNIQUE IDENTITIES AND VULNERABILITIES” 261
sexual orientation asylum claims,116 as many judges have a
rigid view of sexuality in which people are either gay or straight.
Any previous heterosexual experiences may disqualify them as
gay.117  For instance, in Safadi v. Gonzales, an unreported
Sixth Circuit case, the court determined that an asylum appli-
cant claiming membership in a particular social group on the
basis of his sexual orientation was not credible, in part due to a
past, fraudulent marriage to a woman.118  Indeed, the court
noted that inconsistencies in his testimony “raise questions as
to whether Safadi is in fact gay.”119  While Safadi claimed that
the marriage was fraudulent and that he was attracted exclu-
sively to men, the court seemed to be partially motivated by a
suspicion raised by his past relationship with a woman.  This
presumption—that if a man has potentially been attracted to a
woman he could not truthfully be attracted to men—exhibits a
rigidity in the conception of sexual orientation held by the IJ,
the BIA, and the Sixth Circuit.
A similar credibility issue could easily arise for transgender
applicants.  Indeed, it could be a more pervasive issue, since
awareness of transgender identity in the United States tends to
be less common than awareness surrounding sexual orienta-
tion.120  While an IJ might understand the gender identity of a
male-to-female transgender person, for instance, it is less likely
that an IJ will grasp the gender identity of someone who does
not fall neatly within the gender binary, such as a bigender
person.121  If an applicant did not present exclusively as male
or exclusively as female, an IJ would likely question their credi-
bility and whether they were actually transgender, just as IJs
116 See Paul O’Dwyer, A Well-Founded Fear of Having My Sexual Orientation
Asylum Claim Heard in the Wrong Court, 52 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 185, 206–08
(2008).
117 See generally Melanie A. Conroy, Real Bias: How REAL ID’s Credibility and
Corroboration Requirements Impair Sexual Minority Asylum Applicants, 24 BERKE-
LEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 1, 18–20 (2009) (detailing the credibility barriers that gay
asylum applicants face when they have had heterosexual relationships, even if
they were “sham” relationships).
118 148 F. App’x. 372, 376 (6th Cir. 2005) (“We conclude that the various
discrepancies, coupled with the pall cast on Safadi’s credibility by his fraudulent
marriage, are sufficient to support the adverse credibility finding by both the IJ
and the BIA.”).
119 Id. at 377.
120 See McDonough, supra note 69.
121 Bigender people are those who identify as both male and female, either
simultaneously or at different times.  Accordingly, they may present as male at
times and as female at other times. See Bigender, LGBTQIA+ INFO, http://
lgbtqiainfo.weebly.com/bigender.html [https://perma.cc/PE3M-FKER].
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question the credibility of gay people who may have had hetero-
sexual experiences.
Further, the REAL ID Act preferences corroboration
through evidence, which could be another hurdle for trans-
gender people.122  Transgender people who have been able to
access medical care such as counseling, hormones, or surgery
would be able to present their medical records to corroborate
their transgender identities.123  However, for transgender indi-
viduals who have no transgender-related medical records be-
cause they have not been to counseling and either have not yet
or do not wish to transition, meeting the burden of establishing
credibility will be significantly more difficult.  The REAL ID Act
excuses an applicant from supplying corroborating evidence if
“the applicant does not have the evidence and cannot reasona-
bly obtain the evidence.”124  However, in practice it is quite
possible that an IJ would not be satisfied that an individual is
transgender if they sometimes present consistent with the sex
they were assigned at birth and they do not have supporting
medical documentation.
How, then, can transgender people who do not identify or
present strictly as male or female overcome a possible credibil-
ity barrier?  One possible solution might be increased educa-
tion of IJs regarding transgender issues.  In 2011, the U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services released guidance as a
training module for asylum officers to assist them in adjudicat-
ing claims brought by lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, or
intersex individuals.125  The guidance includes definitions re-
lated to sexual orientation as well as gender identity.  It
stresses that not all transgender people receive transgender-
related medical treatment.126  Similar training for IJs could
help reduce this potential barrier for transgender people, as
they are often the ones who ultimately determine whether an
asylum applicant is truly transgender.
122 See 8 U.S.C. § l158(b)(1)(B)(ii) (2012).
123 See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., GUIDANCE FOR ADJUDICATING LESBIAN,
GAY, BISEXUAL, TRANSGENDER, AND INTERSEX (LGBTI) REFUGEE AND ASYLUM CLAIMS
45–46 (2011), http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Humanitarian/
Refugees%20%26%20Asylum/Asylum/Asylum%20Native%20Documents%20
and%20Static%20Files/RAIO-Training-March-2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/
6UBN-5AT7].
124 8 U.S.C. § l158(b)(1)(B)(ii).
125 U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., supra note 123, at 3.
126 Id. at 45–46, 53–55.
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F. Why U.S. Law Should Recognize Transgender People as
a Particular Social Group
One could argue that, practically speaking, not much will
change for transgender applicants even if asylum law recog-
nizes transgender people as a particular social group.  Under
the doctrine established by Hernandez-Montiel, transgender
people, or at least transgender women, have been able to estab-
lish themselves as refugees by presenting themselves as “gay
men with female sexual identities.”127  However, there are sev-
eral reasons why the BIA and the circuit courts should recog-
nize transgender people as a particular social group.
First, as the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Avendano-Her-
nandez demonstrated, transgender people face unique perse-
cution in many countries.128  In some countries, they face more
violent persecution than gay people do, or the kind of discrimi-
nation and mistreatment they experience indicates that their
persecutors perceive their identities as distinct from lesbian,
gay, or bisexual identities.129  Classifying transgender people
as gay creates a risk that IJs will fail to see that transgender
people may still be vulnerable in their countries of nationality
even if conditions are improving there for gay people.
Furthermore, it is crucial that the United States acknowl-
edges transgender people as members of a particular social
group as part of a crucial, larger effort to improve conditions for
transgender people throughout the country.  Currently, trans-
gender people, especially transgender women of color, are
among the most vulnerable members of U.S. society.130  Mem-
bers of these communities are disproportionately likely to be
homeless, making them extremely susceptible to violence and
sexual violence.  According to a 2011 report, 41% of African-
American and 27% of Latino/a transgender respondents exper-
ienced homelessness, and homeless shelters denied access to
many of those respondents.131  A report on hate violence homi-
127 Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1094 (9th Cir. 2000).
128 Avendano-Hernandez v. Lynch, 800 F.3d 1072, 1080 (9th Cir. 2015).
129 See supra notes 91–97 and accompanying text.
130 See HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN & TRANS PEOPLE OF COLOR COALITION, A NATIONAL
CRISIS: ANTI-TRANSGENDER VIOLENCE 1–2 (2015); NATIONAL COALITION OF ANTI-VIO-
LENCE PROGRAMS, LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, TRANSGENDER, QUEER, AND HIV-AFFECTED
HATE VIOLENCE IN 2013 8–11 (2014); JAIME M. GRANT, LISA A. MOTTET, JUSTIN TANIS,
JACK HARRISON, JODY L. HERMAN, & MARA KEISLING, NATIONAL CENTER FOR TRANS-
GENDER EQUALITY & NATIONAL GAY AND LESBIAN TASK FORCE, INJUSTICE AT EVERY TURN:
A REPORT OF THE NATIONAL TRANSGENDER DISCRIMINATION SURVEY 2–8 (2011).
131 GRANT ET AL., supra note 130, at 116.
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cides in 2013 reported that 72% of the victims of these homi-
cides were transgender women.132
Despite these staggering statistics of violence against
transgender people, state anti-discrimination laws still leave
transgender people largely unprotected.  Currently, only eigh-
teen states have nondiscrimination laws protecting people on
the basis of their transgender identity.133  While the issue of
protections for transgender people living in the United States is
a separate issue from recognizing transgender people as a par-
ticular social group in asylum law, this is one of a number of
steps that the U.S. government can and should take to increase
awareness regarding transgender issues.  While the lack of rec-
ognition of transgender people in asylum law is more a symp-
tom of the problem than the cause, continuing to ignore the
existence of transgender people in asylum cases hurts efforts to
achieve equality for transgender people generally.
IV
EXTENDING GENDER IDENTITY CLAIMS TO CISGENDER WOMEN
Once the BIA and the circuit courts have recognized that a
person’s transgender identity can be the basis for membership
in a particular social group, they may be more likely to extend
this precedent to help protect all people who face persecution
on the basis of their gender identity.  Such developments may
make it easier for cisgender women, or theoretically cisgender
men, to claim that they are members of a particular social
group comprised of people who share their gender identity.
A. Current Law on “Women” as a Particular Social Group
Despite the BIA’s enunciation in Acosta that “sex” could be
a characteristic that qualifies a class as a particular social
group,134 few courts have held that simply “women” are a par-
132 NAT’L COAL. OF ANTI-VIOLENCE PROGRAMS, supra note 130, at 8.
133 NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUALITY, State Nondiscrimination Laws, http:
//www.transequality.org/sites/default/files/docs/resources/State-Nondiscrim
ination-Map%20.pdf [https://perma.cc/M5BM-25ZY].
134 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985).
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ticular social group.  Though the Third,135 Eighth,136 Ninth,137
and Tenth138 Circuits have recognized that women in a specific
country may constitute a particular social group, the other
circuits and the BIA have not espoused that view.139
Instead, many courts and the BIA require that women who
face persecution because they are women define their particu-
lar social group as a narrower subset of women with additional
shared characteristics.  For instance, in In re Kasinga, the BIA
defined the Togolese applicant’s particular social group as
“young women of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe who have not
had [female genital mutilation (FGM)], as practiced by that
tribe, and who oppose the practice.”140  As the name suggests,
only women in the applicant’s society are at risk of FGM, and
they face this persecution because they are women.141  Never-
theless, the Board chose to frame the particular social group as
a small subsection of women, using several qualifiers in its
definition.142
135 Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1340 (3d Cir. 1993) (recognizing that “women”
may be a particular social group while denying that the applicant had a well-
founded fear of persecution based solely on her gender).
136 Hassan v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 513, 518 (8th Cir. 2007) (“[W]e hold that a
factfinder could reasonably conclude that all Somali females have a well-founded
fear of persecution based solely on gender given the prevalence of FGM.”). But see
Safaie v. INS, 25 F.3d 636, 640 (8th Cir. 1994) (citing Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1240) (“We
believe this category [of Iranian women] is overbroad, because no factfinder could
reasonably conclude that all Iranian women had a well-founded fear of persecu-
tion based solely on their gender.”).  In both of these cases, the Seventh Circuit
seems to conflate whether a class constitutes a particular social group with
whether all members of the group have a well-founded fear of persecution, which
should be separate inquiries. See Hassan, 484 F.3d at 518; Safaie, 25 F.3d at
640.
137 Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 797–98 (9th Cir. 2005) (deciding
that either “Somalian females” or “young girls in the Benadiri clan” could consti-
tute a particular social group).
138 Niang v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 1187, 1199–1200 (10th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he
focus with respect to such claims should be not on whether either gender consti-
tutes a social group (which both certainly do) but on whether the members of that
group are sufficiently likely to be persecuted that one could say that they are
persecuted ‘on account of’ their membership.” (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A))).
139 See, e.g., Cece v. Holder, 733 F.3d 662, 676 (7th Cir. 2013) (declining to
decide whether gender alone can constitute a particular social group); Rreshpja v.
Gonzales, 420 F.3d 551, 555 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing Mohammed, 400 F.3d at
796–97) (characterizing the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Mohammed as a determi-
nation that all women in Somalia are entitled to asylum); In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N.
Dec. 357, 366 (B.I.A. 1996).
140 21 I. & N. Dec. at 365.  FGM is “a practice in which portions of the female
genitalia are cut away” and “is characterized as a form of ‘sexual oppression.’” Id.
at 361, 366.
141 See id. at 368.
142 See id. at 366.
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Similarly, even though the Ninth Circuit articulated in Mo-
hammed v. Gonzales that “Somalian females” could be a partic-
ular social group, it also stated that alternatively the social
group could be comprised of “young girls in the Benadiri
clan.”143  Further, the Ninth Circuit later clarified in Perdomo v.
Holder that it “[has] not held expressly that females, without
other defining characteristics, constitute a particular social
group.”144  Accordingly, though some courts have recognized
that simply “women” may constitute a particular social group,
jurisdictions have not widely accepted this delineation.
At first glance, the current method that many courts and
the BIA use when dealing with cisgender women in danger of
gender-based persecution—delineating a narrow subset of wo-
men—may seem like a workable solution because these women
are able to establish that they are members of a particular
social group.  However, this framework can pose serious
problems for some applicants.  The definitions of these poten-
tial particular social groups often refer to specific kinds of gen-
der-based persecution, such as FGM145 and domestic
violence.146  Such narrow definitions can be problematic as
they protect women only if the deciding authority finds that the
applicants will be in danger of these particular forms of gender-
based violence throughout their home countries.147  Courts
and the BIA thereby endanger women who may not have a well-
founded fear of that form of persecution throughout the coun-
try but do have a well-founded fear of other forms of gender-
motivated persecution, such as forced marriage.148  Therefore,
it is important that these jurisdictions recognize that “women”
can constitute a particular social group in order to protect
these applicants from all types of gender violence.
143 400 F.3d at 797.
144 611 F.3d 662, 667 (9th Cir. 2010).
145 See, e.g., In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 366 (B.I.A. 1996) (“[T]he
applicant is a member of a social group consisting of young women of the
Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe who have not had FGM, as practiced by that tribe, and
who oppose the practice.”).
146 See, e.g., In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 917 (B.I.A. 1999) (rejecting a
particular social group of “Guatemalan women who have been involved intimately
with Guatemalan male companions, who believe that women are to live under
male domination”), vacated by Att’y Gen. Jan. 19, 2001, remanded 23 I. & N. Dec.
694 (B.I.A. 2005), stay lifted 24 I. & N. Dec. 629 (B.I.A. 2008).
147 See Bethany Lobo, Women as a Particular Social Group: A Comparative
Assessment of Gender Asylum Claims in the United States and United Kingdom, 26
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 361, 378–79 (2012).
148 Id. at 379.
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B. Transgender Identity as a Framework for Gender
Identity in Asylum Claims
1. Transgender Discrimination as Sex Discrimination
Though it is uncommon for attorneys to argue that courts
should extend protections for transgender people to encompass
cisgender women, the reverse argument is a well-trodden one.
That is, a line of cases has established that discrimination
against transgender people falls under the category of sex
discrimination.
This framework has its origins in the landmark case Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, in which the Supreme Court held that
an accounting firm engaged in “sex stereotyping” in violation of
Title VII when it passed over a female employee for a promotion
because she did not conform to expectations of how women
should appear and act.149  Though Hopkins herself did not
identify as transgender, this case has set the stage for trans-
gender people to claim that an entity has discriminated against
them on the basis of sex because they do not conform with
societal gender expectations.
Indeed, several circuits have held that sex discrimination
encompasses discrimination against transgender people under
the Equal Protection Clause, Title VII, and other protections.150
For instance, in 2011, the Eleventh Circuit enunciated in Glenn
v. Brumby that “discrimination against a transgender individ-
ual because of her gender-nonconformity is sex
discrimination.”151
Further, some federal agencies have followed this trend of
protecting transgender people using preexisting sex-discrimi-
nation laws.  The U.S. Department of Education has clarified in
guidance that the sex-related protections of Title IX extend to
transgender students who experience discrimination because
of their gender identities.152  Similarly, the U.S. Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission has held in adjudication that
discrimination against transgender people, as well as against
gay, lesbian, and bisexual individuals, constitutes sex discrim-
149 490 U.S. 228, 255 (1989).
150 See, e.g., Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 575 (6th Cir. 2004) (“[A]
label, such as ‘transsexual,’ is not fatal to a sex discrimination claim where the
victim has suffered discrimination because of his or her gender non-conformity.”);
Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1202 (9th Cir. 2000) (deciding that a
“transsexual” prisoner stated a claim under the Gender-Motivated Violence Act
when she alleged attempted sexual assault by a prison guard).
151 663 F.3d 1312, 1317 (11th Cir. 2011).
152 See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON
TITLE IX AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE 5 (2014).
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ination.153  Clearly, then, it is well established that transgender
people can invoke sex-discrimination laws in various contexts.
2. Implications and Potential Complications of Extending
Transgender Identity to Gender Identity
Since many jurisdictions have accepted that sex-discrimi-
nation laws also protect transgender people, cisgender women
who hope to gain asylum because they will face gender-based
persecution may be able to use the formal recognition of trans-
gender identity to formulate a particular social group com-
prised of their gender.  Once courts and the BIA have
unequivocally recognized transgender identity, cisgender wo-
men living in countries where they face pervasive violence sim-
ply because they are women may have an easier time asserting
that they are members in a particular social group composed of
people who share their gender identity.  In this way, cisgender
women who experience gender-based violence that does not fall
into a recognized category of persecution, such as FGM, may be
able to qualify as members of a particular social group and
overcome one hurdle in obtaining asylum.
Though using the establishment of sexual orientation as a
particular social group in claims brought by transgender peo-
ple has resulted in the problematic conflation of sexual orienta-
tion and transgender identity, this framework does not pose
the same issue.154  In the Hernandez-Montiel line of cases, the
transgender applicants presented themselves as gay men in
order to qualify for asylum.155  Here, contrastingly, cisgender
women would not be claiming that they fit under the category
of “transgender” in order to qualify as members of a particular
social group.  Instead, they would be pointing to the recognition
of one gender identity as a particular social group and arguing
that their gender identity should also qualify as a particular
social group, while keeping their gender identity of “cisgender
women” distinct.
However, the biggest obstacle that cisgender women will
face in advancing this argument is the particularity require-
ment.  In some jurisdictions, the fact that women make up
approximately half of the population will not be fatal to an
applicant’s claim.  For instance, since the BIA has stated that
153 See Macy v. Holder, EEOC Appeal No. 0120120821 (2012), https://www.
pcc.edu/programs/paralegal/documents/macy-v-holder.pdf [https://perma.cc/
63VR-JJMM].
154 See supra Part II.
155 See supra text accompanying notes 72–74.
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the size of the group is only one consideration and the central
concern is whether there is a benchmark for defining who is a
member,156 a cisgender woman may be successful in arguing
that women qualify as a particular social group.  On the other
hand, in circuits where a large membership base can prevent a
group from being particular, such as the Third or Ninth Cir-
cuit,157 applicants may have a difficult time arguing that cis-
gender women constitute a particular social group.158
However, from a policy perspective, the size constraint on
the particularity requirement in some jurisdictions is an un-
necessary point at which to limit who may qualify for asylum.
Rather than focusing on how many people might have similar,
legitimate claims, courts should focus on the nexus require-
ment—that the persecution the applicant faces is “on account
of” the protected characteristic.159  Several circuits have al-
ready adopted this approach by focusing on the strength of the
applicant’s claim, rather than “deny[ing] refuge to a group of
persecuted individuals who have valid claims merely because
too many have valid claims.”160
Further, while the particularity requirement for member-
ship in a particular social group category for asylum sometimes
imposes size limits on who qualifies, the other four characteris-
tics asylum seekers may possess—race, religion, nationality,
and political opinion—do not have such a limitation.161  Since
the BIA’s goal in defining “membership in a particular social
group” was to shape a fifth category that was consistent with
the other four protected grounds,162 it follows that the BIA and
circuit courts should be consistent in their requirements about
the potential size of the applicant pool.
156 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
157 See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text.
158 However, as the Ninth Circuit has already indicated that it would qualify
“Somalian females” as a particular social group, it is less likely that an applicant
in that circuit would face this particularity barrier.  Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400
F.3d 785, 798 (9th Cir. 2005).
159 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2015); INA § 101(a)(42)(A).
160 Cece v. Holder, 733 F.3d 662, 675 (7th Cir. 2013); see also Fatin v. INS, 12
F.3d 1233, 1241 (3d Cir. 1993) (deciding that even though the applicant was a
member of the particular social group of Iranian women, she had not shown that
she would face persecution in Iran solely because she is a woman).
161 See Melanie Randall, Particularized Social Groups and Categorical Impera-
tives in Refugee Law: State Failures to Recognize Gender and the Legal Reception
of Gender Persecution Claims in Canada, The United Kingdom, and the United
States, 23 J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 529, 564 (2015).
162 See In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233–34 (B.I.A. 1985).
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CONCLUSION
The judiciary has set the stage for recognizing transgender
people as a particular social group.  The Ninth Circuit’s deci-
sion in Avendano-Hernandez has called attention to the unfor-
tunate way that asylum law regarding transgender applicants
has developed.  For transgender applicants to be secure in their
eligibility for asylum, the BIA and circuit courts should recog-
nize that transgender people constitute a particular social
group.
Transgender people meet all the requirements for member-
ship in a particular social group.  Transgender identity is a
common, immutable trait among people who do not solely iden-
tify with the sex that society assigned to them at birth.  Fur-
ther, even if people could change their gender identity, it is so
fundamental to people’s identities that they should not be re-
quired to change it.  As transgender people are also socially
distinct and particular, they meet the legal criteria for member-
ship in a particular social group.  In addition, policy aligns with
the introduction of transgender people as a particular social
group, as this will ensure safety for transgender people whom
their society uniquely persecutes.  This is one of many impor-
tant steps on the path to safety and equality for transgender
people.
Moreover, once the BIA and circuit courts formally recog-
nize that transgender people constitute a particular social
group, cisgender women facing gender-based violence may also
benefit from the development.  In a legal argument similar to
those advanced by attorneys looking to use sex-discrimination
laws to protect transgender individuals, cisgender women ex-
periencing gender persecution may be able to claim that their
particular social group is comprised of all women, as they have
a common gender identity.  In this way, a victory for trans-
gender people may also benefit cisgender women facing gender-
based violence in their countries.
